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ON THE IMPORTANCE OF TIME IN IT-RELATED EVENT
STUDIES

Abstract
Until now, time has been mainly used as a variable in IT-related event studies to explain the delayed
impact of IT investments on firm value and productivity. Yet, the timing of the event announcement
itself, due to investor sentiment, may have an effect on its valuation by the capital market. Using the
example of product source code releases as open source, I find that market valuation takes a
curvilinear shape over time due to investor sentiment caused by the rise and fall of the dot.com
bubble. Future IT-related event studies will need to take this potentially interfering effect into account.
Keywords: event study; investor sentiment; dot.com bubble; open source software;
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INTRODUCTION

One factor influencing the valuation of IT investments that seems to have been neglected in event
studies on the impact of IT investments on the value of firms—and one that is particularly relevant to
this area—is the assumption of rational investor underlying event studies, that is, that investors treat
similar investments equally. However, with the dot.com bubble and its burst at the beginning of this
decade, the IT industry is probably the most prominent example of irrational investor behavior of our
time. In IT-related event studies, time, so far, has mainly been included to explain the delayed effect of
IT investments (see, e.g., Im, Dow, & Grover, 2001). Yet, to the knowledge of the author, very few
event studies have explicitly addressed the effect on market valuation that is inherent in the timing of
the announcement, that is, the day on which it happened, in relation to investor sentiment in general,
and, with respect to the IT industry, in particular to the dot.com bubble. In this paper, I thus tackle the
question whether the timing of a strategic IT investment has an impact on its valuation by the capital
market. Using the example of firms announcing the release of proprietary product source code as OSS,
during the time span from January 1, 1999, to April 30, 2007, I find a curvilinear (u-shaped) trend in
the market reaction to firms announcing the release of source code as OSS which can be ascribed to
negative investor sentiment after the burst of the dot.com bubble, rendering time a variable that must
not be ignored it IT-related event studies when the sample, or parts of it, might have been impacted by
investor sentiment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. I will first review the literature on event studies in
general and IT-related ones in particular. Next, I introduce the concept of investor sentiment and
deduce my hypothesis. Afterwards, I explain data and methods used, and, thereafter, present the
results. Finally, I discuss the implications of my findings and limitations of the study and give
recommendations for future research.

2

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

2.1

Literature Review

Event studies have been widely used in the IT and IS literature (see, e.g., Dehning & Richardson,
2002; Dehning, Richardson, & Zmud, 2003; Dos Santos, Peffers, & Mauer, 1993; Im et al., 2001; Oh,
Gallivan, & Kim, 2006). In an event study, the stock market reactions on the public announcement of
specific information affecting a firm are investigated. According to the efficient market hypothesis
(Fama, Fisher, Jensen, & Roll, 1969), the semi-strong form of which is underlying an event study, the
market reacts to the announcement of new information. Basically all publicly available information
goes into the stock price of firms. An event is anything that results in new relevant information which
may have an impact on the future cash flows of a firm (McWilliams and Siegel 1997). Thus, when
firms announce IT-investments to the public the information can be expected to be included in the
stock price shortly after the announcement (Dann, Mayers, Rafts, & Jr, 1977; Mitchell & Netter,
1989).
Past studies have shown that different kinds of IT investments are valuated differently, for example
that innovative IT investments are valuated more positively than non-innovative ones (Dos Santos et
al., 1993) and that the strategic importance of IT is related positively to the valuation of
transformational IT investments (Dehning et al., 2003). They have also shown that firm size or time
horizon of the investment matter: Im, Dow, and Grover (2001) find a negative reaction of stock price
and trading volume with respect to firm size, which, however, becomes more positive as time passes.
The latter is in accordance with findings from related studies that the positive effects of IT investments
only become visible over time (Brynjolfsson, 1993).
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2.2

Investor Sentiment

Time does not only play a role with respect to the effects, that is, the time horizon, of the decision to
go OSS, the timing of the announcement, too, might be of vital importance. The importance of this
observation lies in the fact that, sometimes, capital markets may be inefficient with respect to investors
not behaving rationally. Instead, they, too, are subject to sentiment (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, &
Waldmann, 1990; Lee, Shleifer, & Thaler, 1991): investors will value stocks more positively in a time
of positive investor sentiment and more negatively in a time of negative investor sentiment. Following
the definition of Baker and Wurgler (2007), investor sentiment “is a belief about future cash flows and
investment risks that is not justified by the facts at hand.” Furthermore, Shleifer and Vishny (Shleifer
& Vishny, 1997) have shown that it is both costly and risky for investors to buy and sell against
investor sentiment, leading to an inefficient market that may well result in a crash. Furthermore,
managers seem to be able to react to investor sentiment, so that they for example time IPOs to happen
during phases of positive investor sentiment (Baker & Wurgler, 2000; Lee et al., 1991), which, with
arbitrage unlikely to happen as argued before, will even further increase the risk of a crash. The rise
and fall of Internet-related stocks in the dot.com boom and the eventual burst of the bubble is a prime
example of this phenomenon. In the following, I will give the results of several studies that help
illustrate the effect of the dot.com bubble and the market valuation of IT investments.
As an example for investor sentiment with respect to the IT market around the dot.com bubble burst,
Lee (2001) and Cooper, Dimitrov and Rau (2001) show that IT markets react favorably to firms
changing their name to include ‘.com’ before mid-2000, whereas Cooper et al. (2005) show a positive
effect of the removal of ‘.com’ from the firm name after mid-2000. Similarly, Dehning et al. (2004)
report positive effects on stock price caused by the announcement of e-commerce initiatives in 1998
and—depending on the method they use—negative effects or indications for those for the forth quarter
of 2001.
2.3

Hypothesis

I will analyze to potential effect of investor sentiment due to the burst of the dot.com bubble using the
example of firms announcing the release of product source code as open source software (OSS). OSS
is strongly related with the dot.com bubble as (1) the term “open source” was first publicly announced
on April 8, 1998, right during the dot.com hype and in the course of the source code release of the
Internet browser Netscape Navigator (Tiemann, 2006), (2) the spread of OSS and OSS development
methodologies solely depended on the availability of cheap mass communication as provided by the
Internet, and (3) the release of product source code is an IT-enabled strategic decision as it has a longterm impact on the firm, its ability to generate and appropriate value, and the software development
process. Following the above argumentation on investor sentiment, companies announcing a release of
product source code under OSS should first have received a premium on their stock price during the
rise of the dot.com bubble. Other companies should be able to observe this effect and follow suit. With
the burst of the dot.com bubble in the second half of 2000, market valuation should turn negative. The
number of release announcements will become smaller, too.
With a normalization of investor sentiment with respect to IT investments in general and to the
announcement of the release of (potential) commercial products under an OSS license in particular
over time, I expect this trend to stabilize, and, eventually, to turn positive, that is, both the number of
such announcement and their valuation by investors. In the following, I will give several reasons why
this may be the case, that is, which factors might lead to a normalization of investor sentiment with
respect to product source code releases following the burst of the dot.com bubble.´While customers
did not expect to get access to source code to products at all at the beginning of this decade, for some
segments of the IT industry, this has developed so far as that openness has even become a competitive
factor, thereby making offering one’s source code as OSS the rule rather than the exception in these
areas (Henkel, 2006). Moreover, at the time of the burst of the dot.com-bubble, the market only had a
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rather small number of objects of comparisons showing the positive effects of OSS—especially with
respects to their long-term sustainability of such a strategy. In the time of skepticism thereafter,
consequently, investors most likely evaluated the potential of the idea of releasing valuable intellectual
property into the open skeptically. When positive effects of IT investments and in particular of going
OSS were becoming visible over time (Brynjolfsson, 1993; Dehning et al., 2003), however, the market
began to understand the rational behind and the positive effects of the initial decision, and
consequently reacted more positively to similar future decisions. Again, it is important to note that
“market reaction” not only includes the behavior of investors observing the market, but also other
firms observing the success of their competitors’ OSS efforts, that is, the number of firms announcing
a release of product source code under an OSS license (Baker et al., 2000; Cooper et al., 2005; Lee et
al., 1991).
H1: Over time, there will be a curvilinear (u-shaped) development of the effect on stock price of firms
announcing the release of proprietary software as OSS.

3

DATA AND METHOD

3.1

Event Study Method and Dependent Variable

The research design used in this study is mainly based on the papers of McWilliams and Siegel (1997),
MacKinlay (1997), McWilliams and McWilliams (2000) and Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997). In
an event study, the stock market reactions on the public announcement of specific information
affecting a firm are investigated. According to the efficient market hypothesis, the semi-strong form of
which is underlying an event study, the market reacts to the announcement of new information.
Basically all publicly available information goes into the stock price of firms. An event is anything
that results in new relevant information which may have an impact on the future cash flows of a firm
(McWilliams and Siegel 1997). Thus, when software or technology companies announce the release of
source code to the public the information of releasing code can be expected to be included in the stock
price shortly after the announcement.
In this paper, I define an event as follows: an event is the announcement of the release of proprietary
source code—that could have been sold (or has been)—under an OSI compliant license either to an
existing public open source project or by setting up a new public OSS project. Using Lexis Nexis, I
searched the PR-Newswire, Business Wire, and Market Wire database using the search term “open
source AND (contribute OR release OR reveal) AND code” from January 1999 to April 2007. After
checking whether the company that released code was listed on the AMEX, NYSE, or NASDAQ and
whether the event fit to the event definition, 111 events by 58 firms were identified. As expected,
descriptive statistics of the events show a curvilinear trend in the number of events over time. After
creating a sample of events the time windows had to be specified.
The length of the windows was strongly orientated on the window length found in the related literature
(Brown & Warner, 1985; Campbell et al., 1997; MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams et al., 1997). The
estimation window was defined as 125 trading days and the event window as two days including the
event day and the day prior to the event. The inclusion of the day prior to the event was to take
anticipation effects into account. I then checked for confounding events within this period of time. A
confounding event was defined as an announcement within the event window that might overshadow
the effect of the actual event on the stock price of the company. Confounding events were for example
the announcement of new products, information about pending lawsuits, or the release of quarterly or
annual reports.
The check for confounding events eliminated 69 of the 111 events. A possible reason for the mass of
confounding events may be that many software companies tend to publish information on new
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products, strategic partnerships, etc. in bundles on conferences and other mass events.1 In addition,
four more events had to be removed from the sample; three events because the IPO of the respective
firms had only happened recently, so that the available stock price data would not have sufficed for the
125-day estimation window. Another event was removed because the respective firm was considered
for delisting at the time of the event. A list of all remaining 38 events by 30 firms with no confounding
events is given in Table 1.
ID
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Firm
3DFX INTERACTIVE
APPLIX
SILICON GRAPHICS
VISIO
SILICON GRAPHICS
BINDVIEW DEV
SUN MICROSYSTEMS
INTEL
SYBASE
CADENCE DESIGN SYS.
SAP
SANCHEZ COMPUTER ASSOCS.
PROGRESS SOFTWARE
ADAPTEC
SUN MICROSYSTEMS
ON2 TECHS.
IBM
OPENWAVE SYS.
ORACLE
APPLE
COMMERCE ONE
REALNETWORKS
BEA SYSTEMS
TIPPINGPOINT TECHS.
IONA TECHNOLOGIES
EBAY
QUOVADX
ORACLE
IBM
IBM
AUTODESK
WIND RIVER SYSTEMS
SUN MICROSYSTEMS
TIBCO SOFTWARE
QUALCOMM
ADOBE SYSTEMS
SUN MICROSYSTEMS
ADOBE SYSTEMS

Table 1.

Date
1999-03-01
1999-03-02
1999-04-26
1999-07-27
2000-02-14
2000-02-15
2000-03-13
2000-06-15
2000-08-22
2000-09-11
2000-10-04
2000-11-06
2000-12-11
2001-01-30
2001-04-25
2001-08-07
2001-11-05
2002-05-30
2002-08-14
2002-09-25
2003-04-29
2003-07-07
2004-05-19
2004-11-01
2005-06-20
2005-06-21
2005-07-19
2005-08-09
2005-08-09
2005-08-15
2006-03-07
2006-07-31
2006-08-23
2006-10-02
2006-10-11
2006-11-07
2006-11-13
2007-04-26

CARi
0.86%
10.86%
4.18%
5.32%
-0.57%
-0.84%
-3.92%
-3.27%
-1.80%
12.39%
-3.79%
4.97%
0.02%
1.05%
-8.38%
1.08%
-1.36%
-3.01%
1.12%
-2.25%
-7.57%
-0.48%
1.26%
11.50%
-1.09%
-2.51%
-2.97%
0.88%
0.61%
0.42%
-1.04%
1.46%
3.21%
0.67%
4.92%
2.75%
-2.09%
0.07%

Main OSS business model as stated
Complementary goods or services
Complementary goods or services
Complementary goods or services
Dual licensing
Complementary goods or services
Business transformation
Complementary goods or services
Complementary goods or services
Cost or risk reduction
Complementary goods or services
Complementary goods or services
Complementary goods or services
Complementary goods or services
Complementary goods or services
Business transformation
Business transformation
Business transformation
Complementary goods or services
Complementary goods or services
Business transformation
Business transformation
Dual licensing
Complementary goods or services
Complementary goods or services
Business transformation
Complementary goods or services
Business transformation
Complementary goods or services
Complementary goods or services
Business transformation
Complementary goods or services
Complementary goods or services
Business transformation
Dual licensing
Cost or risk reduction
Business transformation
Business transformation
Dual licensing

List of all events

As is shown in Figure 1, as expected, we find a curvilinear trend in the number of event announcement
over time in the sample when both including and excluding confounding events.
1

An example of such a conference is the JavaOne conference organized by Sun Microsystems Inc. (SUN, 2007).
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Distribution of events over time

Using the market model and the NASDAQ Composite Index as comparable market index, I then
calculated the cumulated abnormal return (CAR) for each event, which was the dependent variable in
the multivariate analysis.
3.2

Independent and Control Variables

In order to measure the effect of time, I calculated the number of days that had passed since the press
conference on April 8, 1998 (Tiemann, 2006) in which “open source” was coined and the day of the
event. For ease of interpretation, I divided this figure by 365.25 to arrive at the number of years. To
account for the assumed curvilinear relationship, I included a variable “time-squared.” 2
With respect to control variables, Henkel (2006) found that small firms tend to release more code
since they lack development resources and benefit from external development support. In addition, I
included the firm’s R&D-to-sales and sales-per-employee ratio to account for research intensity of the
firm and employee productivity. Sales per employee were transformed to sales per 1000 employees to
ease interpretability of the results. To account for the type of IT investment inherent in the decision to
go OSS, the business model the company chose to do so was included. In the press releases, I looked
for information which business models the firm was primarily intending to follow. I distinguished
between (solely) long-term strategic investments that targeted at transforming the industry the
company was active in on the one hand and on business models with a short to mid-term impact on
bottom-line profits of the corporation as inherent in the business models cost or risk reduction, dual
licensing, and sale of complementary goods and assets. This was coded as a dummy variable with
respect to whether the business transformation model was employed or not. In order to ensure
2

Similarly, one may include dummy variables for the separate years (see, e.g., Aggarwal, Dai, & Walden, 2006) which
would also allow to more accurately analyze for different effects in the individual years. I refrained from doing so in this
study and instead used the time and time-squared measures to reduce the number of variables in the regression because of
the sample size. I have also conducted a regression using only time-dummy variables, dropping the singular event from
2007, arriving at similar results as those depicted herein.
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reliability of this variable, multiple coders completed such a categorization independently of one
another. Differences were resolved in discussions afterwards, and the final categorization was
unanimously accepted. Descriptive statistics are available in Table 2, correlations are given in Table 3.

CARi
Time
Time2
ln(Total Assets)
ln(Total Assets)2
R&D-to-sales
Sales per 1000 employees
Business transformation
Cost/Risk reduction
Dual licensing
Compl. goods or services

Table 2.

Mean
0.01
4.86
30.96
14.37
212.91
0.22
2.30
0.32
0.05
0.11
0.53

Median
0.00
4.41
19.43
14.40
207.26
0.16
0.28
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00

Std. dev.
0.04
2.74
27.78
2.58
72.38
0.28
12.48

Min
-0.08
0.90
0.80
8.28
68.49
0.06
0.00
0
0
0
0

Max
0.12
9.05
81.88
18.46
340.74
1.74
77.21
1
1
1
1

Descriptive statistics (N=38)
CARi

Time

Time2

CARi
Time
Time2
ln
(Total assets)
R&D-to-sales
Sales per 1000
employees
Business
transformation

1
-0.05
0.01

1
0.98**

1

-0.12
-0.04

0.20
-0.07

0.41*
-0.34*

Table 3.

Correlation table (N=38; † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01; p-values are two-sided)

4

ln(Total
assets)

R&Dto-sales

0.18
-0.10

1
-0.56**

1

0.10

0.07

0.22

0.02

1

0.22

0.18

-0.04

0.28†

-0.11

Business
transformation

1

RESULTS

Independent Variable
Time
Time2
ln(Total assets)
ln(Total assets)2
R&D-to-sales
Sales per 1000 employees
Business model: business transformation (dummy)
Constant

Table 4.

Sales per 1000
employees

Coefficient value
-0.030*
0.003*
-0.040
0.001
-0.029
0.002**
-0.025†
0.379†

Results of OLS regression on CAR using business model “business transformation” as
reference group (†p < .10*, p < .05, **; p < .01; p-values are two-sided)

As expected, descriptive statistics show a curvilinear trend in the number of announcements over time
(see Figure 1). Turning to the abnormal returns, I take a look at factors influencing the CAR for
individual events. Conducting a regression analysis with CARi as dependent variable using the
independent and control variables introduced before, I arrive at a model with an R2 of 44% (see Table
4). With respect to my hypothesis, I find that both measures for time—years since the inception and
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OSS and years squared—carry the expected sign and are highly significant (pone-sided < 0.01 for both)
resulting in the predicted curvilinear trend.
To control for possible autocorrelation effects between, that is, events originating from the same firm,
in the regression, I reduced the sample to include only one event by one firm (N = 30) by using only
the first or only the last event by the respective firms in two separate regression. In both analyses, the
effect of time remains significant (all p-values = 0.02). Similar tests where conducted for events
having happened shortly after one another only to find identical results.

5

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Projected cumulative abnormal returns

0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0
0

2

4

6

8

10

-0.01
-0.02
Time since OSS inception

Figure 2.

Projected CARs using only time and time squared

In this study, I have shown that the timing of a strategic IT investment drives its valuation by the
capital market. I find that there is a curvilinear trend that is most likely explained by investor
sentiment. Initially, that is, during the dot.com hype, I see a positive valuation of OSS by the capital
market that, however, turns negative with the burst of the bubble. In fact, if I use the regression
coefficients from Table 4 and insert mean values for all other variables but time (see Figure 2), the
date value of the first root of the resulting quadratic equation turns out to be January 10, 2001, which
is right after the dot.com crash. The second root is August 13, 2005, coming shortly before the
NASDAQ price increased to and then stabilized around 2,300 points—the highest value since 2001—
and during a series of source code releases in 2005. Furthermore, when I assign the events to two
groups based on whether they lie within or outside this time interval, I see that they significantly differ
in their market valuation (see Table 5). Moreover, I see a nearly identically shaped trend for the
number of announcements per years, which indicates deliberate management action in response to
investor sentiment.
Date of Announcement
10/1/01 – 08/13/05
Other
T-test

Table 5.

Obs.
16
22
0.054†

Mean
-0.008
0.016
(p-value, one-sided)

Std. Err.
0.011
0.009

Effect of investor sentiment (univariate analysis)

Std. Dev.
0.044
0.043
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Of course, I do not expect this evaluation to become infinitively more positive but rather to level off at
zero—at which point in time the release of source code under an OSS license will have truly become
mainstream firm behavior. In addition, I think that the curvilinear relationship observed in this study
may well hold for more segments of the IT sector and related industries. Henkel and Käs (2007) have
for example observed that the number of firms releasing source code in several areas of embedded
computing such as single-board computers has been steadily increasing over the last years. I would
assume market reaction to the respective announcements to follow a similar u-shape.
What is more, I think that this study has generally illustrated the effect that investor sentiment towards
a certain action has on its valuation on the market and how investor sentiment and management
reaction to it can change over time. First, during the time of the dot.com bubble, OSS—as probably
any other Internet-related IT investment—was heartily embraced by the capital market and firms
announcing an OSS strategy saw their stock price increase abnormally. Managers observing and
understanding this would consequently think about if and how their firms could also release product
source code as OSS. With the bubble burst and investor sentiment turning negative, both the valuation
and the number of OSS strategies decreased. When the stock market, especially the NASDAQ,
stabilized and began to again steadily increase in value, firms making OSS-related announcements
could again achieve positive abnormal returns and, again, the number of firms doing so consequently
increased. I would thus expect studies analyzing the development of stock prices or IPO performance
in the IT sector and maybe also related industries such as telecommunications to find an underlying
curvilinear trend over time with respect to market performance caused by investor sentiment on the
one hand and, on the other hand, with respect to the number of announcements caused by managers’
deliberate reaction to the perceived investor sentiment. Maybe such a curvilinear trend can also be
found in the datasets that have been analyzed in previous event studies on the effect of IT investments
on the market value of the firm.3
Like any other event study this paper faces some limitations. One limitation may be the rather small
sample size. Limiting the event window to one day so that the confounding check eliminates fewer
events might seem as a solution to this problem, however, as I expect rather strong anticipation effects
on the day preceding the event, this does not seem to be a wise choice. Rather, one might think about
expanding the search terms and applying those to more and different data sources as the ones used in
the study, or recomposing the study in a couple of years: since the number of qualified events has been
steadily increasing over the past view years, redoing the study in a few years time should produce a
much larger sample size. In such a study, learning effects of firms over time might be analyzed, too,
that is, such studies could look at whether the success or failure in previous efforts to release source
code under an OSS license has an impact on the market valuation of another such announcement.
This study has shown the effect of investor sentiment on the market valuation of Internet-related IT
investments using the example of product source code releases as open source. I have shown that, over
time, the market values similar investments differently just because of the timing of the
announcement. Similarly, managers were able to react to this and increased or reduced the number of
corresponding actions depending on investor sentiment. The timing of the announcement,
consequently, is an important variable influencing market valuation, and must not be ignored in ITrelated event studies in which the sample, or parts of it, may come from periods of time during which
strong investor sentiments are to be expected.

3

This curvilinear trend still holds when integration an interaction term between time and the business transformation
model to capture potential long-term effects of this business model. Moreover, the new coefficient is positive and
significant (pone-sided = 0.05), indicating that the market, over time, has come to better appreciate this business model, too.
Another possible explanation might be that firms have come to understand that the business transformation model alone
is not sustainable—or at least not accordingly valuated by the capital market—and over time learned to combine it
effectively with one of the other models.
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